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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the type of tax planning included in tax directors’ 
compensation contracts. Using detailed data on tax director incentive compensation, we 
examine whether the incentives provided to tax directors are associated with lower 
effective tax rates and/or a wider book-tax gap. We also examine whether tax director 
incentives are more strongly linked to measures of the impact of taxes on cash flows (i.e., 
cash effective tax rates and taxable income) or earnings (i.e., GAAP effective tax rates 
and pre-tax book income). Finally, we investigate whether tax director incentives are 
associated with proxies for aggressive tax planning. 
Our study complements and extends the recent literature that links tax planning 
with top executive incentive compensation (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Rego and 
Wilson, 2010) and executive/corporate culture (e.g., Frank et al., 2009; Dyreng et al., 
2010).1 Although these studies show that both the incentives of top management and 
corporate culture have a significant impact on effective tax rates, it is not clear whether 
top management directly engages in tax planning or whether the documented tax effects 
are a byproduct of the investing, financing, and operating decisions made within the firm. 
For example, an observed relationship between top management’s incentives and 
measures of tax planning may be an indirect outcome of the investment decision rather 
than from deliberate tax planning. To understand the link between performance measures 
and observed tax attributes, it is necessary to explicitly consider the incentive 
compensation of the tax director, who is the executive charged with overseeing the firm’s 
tax function. However, an alternative scenario is that all tax planning decisions are 
                                                 
1 This literature suggests that a firm’s culture, representing the shared beliefs within the firm regarding the 
optimal course of action, can lead to endemic aggressiveness in all of a firm’s business decisions, including 
the tax function (e.g., Cronqvist et al., 2007).  
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merely dictated by top management to the tax director, who has no ability to 
independently affect firm behavior. If tax planning is a role merely encompassed in top 
management’s duties, then we might not observe an association between tax director 
incentives and measures of tax planning after controlling for the incentives of top 
management.  
To investigate the relative importance of various measures of tax planning in tax 
director incentive compensation contracts, we use a proprietary data set that includes 
detailed compensation information for many executives, including the members of the tax 
department, for a sizeable sample of mostly large U.S. firms. This unique data exhibits 
several advantages relative to that used in prior research. First, it allows us to directly 
measure the incentive compensation of the executives who are directly responsible for the 
firm’s tax function. Second, it provides us with information about the incentive 
compensation of other members of the management team. This within-firm benchmark 
allows us to identify the attributes of the compensation plan that are unique to tax 
directors, as opposed to the general compensation policy of the firm.  
   We first examine the association between executive incentives and the GAAP and 
Cash effective tax rates (ETRs). Recent research presents evidence that variation in 
corporate tax planning is captured by ETRs (Dyreng et al., 2008; Robinson et al., 2010). 
We find a strong negative relationship between tax director incentives and the GAAP 
ETR and no relationship between tax director incentives and the Cash ETR. These results 
indicate that tax directors are provided with incentives to reduce the tax expense reported 
in the financial statements. Thus, our findings are consistent with the GAAP ETR being a 
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more informative measure of the tax director’s actions and, accordingly, it is allocated 
more weight in the incentive compensation contract 
We next examine the book-tax gap, because this measure has recently received 
considerable attention from the U.S. Treasury, regulators, and academics. We find no 
evidence of a relationship between tax director incentive compensation and the spread 
between pre-tax book income and taxable income. Since the book-tax gap is defined as 
the difference between pre-tax book income and taxable income, there are econometric 
reasons to disaggregate this variable into its two components (i.e., pre-tax book income 
and taxable income). In addition, separating the book-tax gap allows us to look for 
evidence of conforming tax planning (i.e., where tax planning reduces both book and tax 
income). The results of this analysis provide no evidence of an association between the 
incentive compensation of tax directors and lower taxable income.  
Finally, we examine the relationship between tax director incentive compensation 
and two measures developed to explicitly capture tax aggressiveness: a modified version 
of Frank et al.’s (2009) DTAX measure and Wilson’s (2009) measure of tax sheltering. 
We find no evidence that tax directors’ incentive compensation is associated with either 
measure of tax aggressiveness. Collectively, our results indicate that tax directors are 
provided incentives to reduce the level of tax expense reported in the financial 
statements, but provide little support for the notion that tax directors are compensated on 
the basis of the book-tax gap, the cash effective tax rate, or various measures of “tax 
aggressiveness.”  
The remainder of the paper consists of the following seven sections. Section 2 
provides a description of the possible roles of the tax director, and Section 3 reviews the 
 4
prior empirical literature on tax planning. Section 4 describes our proprietary sample and 
other data used in our analysis. We develop our variable measurement and 
methodological approach in Section 5. Our results are presented in Section 6, and 
sensitivity analyses are provided in Section 7. Conclusions and summary comments are 
provided in Section 8. 
 
2. Role of the Tax Director 
 Although tax directors are responsible for one of the firm’s largest outflows of 
cash and one of the largest expenses on the income statement, little is known about how 
these executives are compensated. Since tax directors are rarely among the top five 
highest paid executives, information about their annual compensation and equity holdings 
is not available in annual proxy (Form DEF 14A) filings. Therefore, researchers are 
typically unable to directly observe the parameters of tax director incentive pay. 
 The tax director fills at least three roles. First, the tax director is responsible for 
compliance. Since multinational firms are typically required to file thousands of tax 
forms annually, it is not unreasonable to infer that compliance is the tax director’s 
primary duty. Second, the tax director may serve as an advisor to the firm’s senior 
executives by providing expertise in minimizing the tax cost of the firm’s operating, 
financing, and investing activities. As an advisor, the tax director would be present when 
strategic investment decisions are made but may not be responsible for selecting the 
investments. Third, the tax director can be charged with actively pursuing tax planning 
opportunities by generating investment opportunities where the net present value of the 
project derives solely from tax benefits. We view this third role, termed the “active 
 5
planning” role, as relatively more tax aggressive than the other two advisory roles.2 It is 
difficult to empirically distinguish the advisor from the active planner, as both roles could 
yield lower tax obligations, and there can easily be an overlap in duties.  
In terms of selecting the compensation contract for the tax director, traditional 
agency theory suggests that compensation should be based on performance measures that 
are controllable by the agent (Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert, 2001). Therefore, if the tax 
director’s primary responsibility is compliance, then the incentive component of pay 
should not be based on cash flow or earnings objectives (i.e., there are more direct 
measures of tax director effort, such as fines paid for noncompliance). On the other hand, 
the incentive compensation of a tax advisor and an active planner should be a function of 
the firm’s financial attributes, since these performance measures are, in part, controllable 
by these types of tax directors. 
Our characterization of the various roles of the tax director is consistent with the 
Tax Executive Institute, Inc.’s (TEI) 2004-2005 Corporate Tax Department Survey, 
which provides information on several dimensions of the operations of firms’ tax 
departments.3 This document is the compilation of the responses of approximately 1,300 
tax departments (of which 945 were at publicly traded firms), representing a 57% 
response rate, to a mid-2004 survey generated by a consulting firm. Although the survey 
                                                 
2 Clearly, the advisory role can also generate positive net present value for the firm. However, we view the 
advisor as effectively reducing the tax cost of an incremental investment opportunity (i.e., the net present 
value of the project includes non-tax components). A tax advisor does not typically undertake transactions 
that fail the business purpose test (i.e., there are non-tax benefits to the transaction). In contrast, an active 
planner will need to justify why there are benefits beyond the tax attributes of the transaction (see Gregory 
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935)). As Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) point out, there is no universally 
accepted definition of tax aggressiveness. So we are left to make an (albeit coarse) attempt at segregating 
tax planning from tax aggressiveness for the purposes of our analysis. 
3 The Tax Executives Institute is a professional organization of roughly 5,000 business executives who are 
responsible for taxation matters. The TEI survey data is separate from the proprietary data used later in our 
analysis. 
 6
focuses on identifying the specific duties of the tax departments (e.g., time spent on 
foreign versus domestic compliance, types of entities responsible for, and nexus issues), 
it does provide descriptive information on the organization of the tax department and 
some performance metrics of tax department personnel.  
The senior tax executives of the public survey respondents typically hold the title 
of tax director (40%) or vice president (35%) (described in aggregate hereafter as tax 
directors), and those titles suggest that these individuals hold high level positions in their 
respective firms. Sixty-five percent of the tax directors report to the chief financial 
officer. The majority (60%) of public companies report that their tax function is 
centralized and globally integrated, so the tax director is responsible for taxes worldwide. 
In terms of specific tasks, the majority of the tax director’s time is spent doing research 
(33%) and compliance (28%).4 The average tax director spends 9% of his or her time on 
the tax provision and 8% of his or her time on tax audits. In terms of the average tax 
department’s budget, 60% is allocated toward compensation and 20% toward outside 
consultants. Finally, tax directors appear involved in the overall operations of the firm, as 
the survey reports that tax directors spend 9% of their time aiding in operational issues of 
the firm (including governance and Sarbanes-Oxley compliance).  
The TEI Survey also provides some descriptive information on the performance 
metrics of a firm’s top tax executive. Seventy-one percent of the survey’s senior tax 
executives of public companies reported that “lack of surprises” was used by senior 
management to evaluate their performance. Since the effective tax rate (63%) is of 
slightly more importance than generating cash savings (57%) for performance evaluation, 
it appears that income statement surprises could potentially dominate cash flow surprises. 
                                                 
4 Note that time on research includes 8.1% of their time related to mergers and acquisitions. 
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Note that the cash savings is not necessarily solely attributable to taxes, as only 49% of 
respondents indicated that they were evaluated on the basis of cash taxes. Although 
anecdotal, our conversations with 12 tax directors suggest that their primary performance 
metric was “economic value added,” as measured by financial statement earnings. 
However, only 19% of the tax directors surveyed agreed. Finally, the TEI survey reports 
that only 30% of the incentive compensation of executives other than the tax director was 
based on after-tax measures. 
 Our analysis is based on the maintained assumption that the tax director is not the 
primary executive charged with selecting the firm’s investment activity. Although tax 
directors are involved in transaction planning and investment location decisions, their 
role appears to be primarily as an advisor. This characterization is consistent with the TEI 
survey evidence documenting that the majority of the tax director’s time involves tasks 
related to return compliance and research. In later tests, we attempt to separate out the 
advisory role from the active planner role by studying specific measures intended to 
proxy for aggressive tax planning. To the extent that there is overlap between the duties 
of tax directors and other senior executives, our analyses should yield similar associations 
between our measures of tax planning and the incentives of the other executives. As we 
discuss below, the statistical differences observed across executive positions is a key 
feature of our methodological approach. 
3. Prior Literature 
3.1. Executive incentives and financial and tax reporting 
In contrast to the fairly extensive literature on incentives and financial 
misreporting, there is relatively little work linking executives’ incentives with tax 
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aggressiveness.5  Slemrod (2004) develops the idea that shareholders select the level of 
tax aggressiveness by linking tax manager compensation with effective tax rates or stock 
price. However, one serious limitation in this model is that shareholders cannot observe 
the compensation contract or know whether managers are engaging in legal tax planning 
or illegal tax evasion. Thus, inappropriate aggressive behavior by the tax director 
constitutes a “hidden action,” because tax returns are not disclosed to investors (see 
Crocker and Slemrod, 2005), and shareholders do not know whether to alter the 
executive’s compensation contract until after the firm is penalized. In addition, it is 
difficult to contract on tax evasion, since the behavior is illegal and therefore would 
render any contract that is a function of this outcome unenforceable by the courts (Chen 
and Chu, 2005). Ultimately, Slemrod (2004) suggests that corporate tax noncompliance 
(tax evasion) could be the result of the design of incentive compensation plans.  
For the purposes of our study, a shortcoming of the theoretical literature 
investigating the link between incentives and tax planning is that it fails to address the 
fact that large public firms are typically not assessed fines or penalties upon audit. Most 
settlements are made with the taxing authorities at a fraction of the dollar amount of the 
original assessment.6 Therefore, non-evasive but aggressive tax planning can be viewed 
                                                 
5 See Armstrong et al. (2010) for a review of the literature on executives’ incentives for financial 
misreporting. Much of the extant work focuses on whether equity incentives align managers’ interests with 
respect to financial reporting with those of shareholders, or whether equity incentives instead induce 
managers to manipulate accounting information for personal gain. More recently, a number of studies, 
including Feng et al. (2009) and Jiang et al. (2010), examine the relationship between the incentives of the 
CFO and earnings management. Jiang et al. (2010) argue that “because CFOs’ primary responsibility is 
financial reporting … CFO equity incentives should play a stronger role than those of the CEO in earnings 
management.” This rationale for examining CFOs’ incentives is analogous to our reasoning for examining 
the relationship between the incentives of the tax director and the firm’s tax attributes. 
6 For example, GlaxoSmithKline PLC (Glaxo) settled a transfer pricing audit with the IRS for $3.4 billion. 
According to Glaxo’s 20-F filings and the IRS’s press release, the payment was made to cover “back taxes 
and interest” – no penalties were assessed. Press reports suggest that Glaxo settled for about 60% of the 
original assessment. Further, Glaxo reported in its 20-F filing that the after-tax cost of the settlement was 
$3.1 billion, suggesting that interest was roughly $1 billion of the settlement (assuming a 30% tax rate). 
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as merely a borrowing arrangement with tax authorities. These models also do not 
consider the nature of the underlying tax planning (temporary versus permanent tax 
deductions) and the tax planning’s impact on the financial statements. The reversal of a 
permanent tax deduction will have a much larger impact on a firm’s GAAP ETR than 
will a reversal of a temporary tax deduction. Hence, we need models that jointly consider 
both the cash flows and earnings implications of tax planning when considering optimal 
tax director incentives. Finally, note that both Crocker and Slemrod (2005) and Chen and 
Chu (2005) focus on incentives and tax evasion rather than on linking incentives to 
general tax director planning duties that affect either earnings or cash flows. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2006) develop a model linking equity-based 
compensation and aggressive tax planning. They argue that there are complementarities 
between tax sheltering and rent extraction that imply that incentives lead to more 
sheltering behavior in better governed firms. Although equity incentives can motivate 
managers to increase tax sheltering, this decision will also lead to fewer opportunities for 
managers to engage in rent extraction. Thus, the relationship between equity-based 
compensation and tax sheltering is theoretically ambiguous.7  
There is also a growing related literature that investigates whether corporate 
culture and individual managers influence a firm’s level of tax aggressiveness. Frank et 
                                                                                                                                                 
Since the dispute covered the period from 1989 to 2005, a rough estimate of the pre-tax interest rate on the 
settlement is 4.5% (or 3.2%, after taxes), assuming an eight year interest accrual period. If we consider that 
the IRS effectively forgave 40% of the assessment, then the effective borrowing rate is actually negative, 
since the initial “loan” from the government was for $4 billion (= 2.4 / 0.6) and the final payment was only 
$3.4 billion. In addition, the IRS Data Book (see Tables 9a and 17 for 2008 and 2009) provides an analysis 
of the amount of penalties assessed. Overall, for incorporated business, penalties appear to constitute only 
1.45% (0.56%) of the additional taxes due in 2008 (2009). In addition, 32% (40%) of the corporate 
accuracy-related penalties assessed are abated in 2008 (2009). 
7 Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that any directional prediction for the association between tax 
planning and equity incentives is conditional on the firm’s governance structure. However, it is not clear 
how the tax director would be able to extract rents from the firm. As pointed out in footnote 6, even 
detected aggressive tax planning can be a positive net present value project that benefits shareholders. 
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al. (2009) argue that a positive relationship between aggressive financial and tax 
reporting is consistent with a generally aggressive corporate “tone and culture.” 
Ultimately, they find evidence of a positive relationship between earnings management 
and tax planning and that the market appears to reward this aggressiveness. However, 
they do not find meaningful evidence that the CEO and CFO are provided with incentives 
to undertake such behavior.  
Phillips (2003) investigates whether compensating managers on a pre- versus 
after-tax basis affects the firm’s reported tax expense. Using a proprietary dataset, he 
finds that compensating business unit managers on an after-tax basis is associated with 
lower firm GAAP effective tax rates. Consistent with the finding that equity risk-taking 
incentives motivate managers to undertake more aggressive tax planning, Rego and 
Wilson (2010) find a positive association between option vega and measures of corporate 
tax aggressiveness. Dyreng et al. (2010) investigate whether specific members of the top 
management team are associated with firms’ level of tax aggressiveness. Although they 
conclude that top management is associated with tax planning, it is not clear whether 
their results are attributable to top management’s explicit setting of the “tone at the top” 
with regard to tax aggressiveness or making strategic decisions such as investment and 
financing policies that are highly correlated with a firm’s tax position.  
Finally, Robinson et al. (2010) attempt to measure tax manager incentives by 
determining whether the tax department is viewed as a profit center (i.e., a “contributor to 
the bottom line”). Although an indirect measure of managerial incentives, this is one of 
the few studies to consider the incentive compensation plan of the tax manager (as 
opposed to the CEO, CFO, or other senior executives). They find evidence that firms 
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with tax departments that are viewed as profit centers have lower GAAP ETRs, but they 
have only weak evidence that firms with tax departments that are viewed as profit centers 
have lower cash ETRs. 
Collectively, prior literature provides limited evidence that managerial incentives 
influence tax planning choices. However, there is no evidence related to the precise 
incentives of the tax director, who is the person most directly involved in the tax 
decisions of the firm. Thus, our subsequent empirical analysis focuses primarily on the 
compensation and incentives of the tax director and the impact of these incentives on 
firms’ various tax attributes. However, we are careful to control for the incentives of 
other high level executives who might also be expected to play a role in the firm’s tax 
planning, which allows us to isolate the unique effect of the tax director on the firm’s 
various tax attributes. 
3.2. Book-tax gap 
Treasury (1999), Desai (2003), and Boynton et al. (2005) all document the growth 
of the spread between aggregate financial statement income and aggregate taxable 
income as reported by the IRS (“the book-tax gap”).8 Book income in excess of taxable 
income is consistent with manipulation of earnings reported to the capital markets, tax 
aggressiveness, or some combination of these two activities.9 The discretion available in 
GAAP provides managers with an opportunity to manage book earnings upward without 
necessarily affecting taxable income (e.g., Badertscher et al., 2009). Similarly, Mills 
(1998) and Desai (2003) suggest that the expanding book-tax gap appears to be consistent 
                                                 
8 Graham, Raedy and Shackelford (2010) use financial statement data to estimate the BTG from 1993 to 
2008 and find that book income has exceeded estimated taxable income in all years except 2001 and 2008 
(i.e., years with excessive losses). 
9 Seidman (2010) conjectures that the growing book-tax gap could also be due to changes in accounting 
methods over time. 
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with aggressive tax planning. Phillips et al. (2003), Hanlon (2005), and Ayers et al. 
(2006) provide evidence that the divide between tax and financial reporting is partially 
attributable to earnings management. Finally, Frank et al. (2009) find evidence 
suggesting that firms that manage earnings also aggressively manage taxes.  
Prior literature has not reached a consensus about the source of the increase in the 
book-tax gap.10 For the purposes of our study, examining the link between executive 
incentives and the book-tax gap can provide new insights into whether firms appear to 
compensate managers in general, and tax directors in particular, in a manner that 
potentially induces a wider book-tax gap.  
 
4. Sample  
      Our sample is derived from the proprietary data files provided to us by a large 
human resources consulting firm. The data covers the fiscal years from 2002 to 2006 and 
is obtained by a detailed annual survey by the consulting firm. The proprietary data 
provides information on the major components of executive compensation for many 
executive positions, including the tax director. We retain all public firms for which there 
is complete compensation data for CEO, CFO, general counsel, and tax director, and 
where we can estimate all of the tax attributes and control variables. Our final sample 
consists of 423 unique firms and 1,162 firm-year observations that are nearly uniformly 
                                                 
10 There continue to be many unanswered questions about the book-tax gap. It is frequently argued that tax 
aggressiveness must have increased over the mid- to late-1990s, as reported corporate profits surged more 
than did reported taxable income. However, it is unclear why firms would begin to seek to lower their tax 
burden more during this period rather than during others. What changed during this time period? While the 
sophistication of capital markets has increased over time, yielding new sheltering opportunities, the extent 
of the increase in the book-tax gap seems to far exceed documented examples of product sheltering (see 
Graham and Tucker, 2006, and Wilson, 2009). Furthermore, many new sheltering products were created 
because Treasury had eliminated an original transaction (e.g., the elimination of “Boss” led to the creation 
of “Son of Boss”).  
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distributed across the sample period (244, 239, 222, 234, and 223 observations from 2002 
to 2006, respectively). 
      The industry composition of the sample relative to all firms on Compustat for the 
same sample period (i.e., 2002 to 2006) is provided in Table 1, Panel A. Relative to the 
full Compustat sample, our sample of firm years includes a greater proportion of firms 
from Food, Textiles, and Chemicals and a somewhat smaller proportion of firms from 
Financial Services, but is otherwise very similar. In Panel B of Table 1, we report the 
representation of our sample in both the population of Compustat and the S&P 500. 
Across all years, our sample represents approximately 30% of total assets and 33% of the 
total cash paid for taxes of firms in Compustat. In addition, although our sample includes 
roughly 50% of the firms in the S&P 500, it includes 65% of the total assets and 60% of 
the total cash paid for taxes. Thus, our sample captures a large fraction of the economic 
activity (and taxes paid) in the U.S. economy as a whole and S&P 500 in particular. 
Descriptive statistics for our sample are reported in Table 2. The mean (median) 
revenue and market capitalization for our sample is $17,817 ($8,211) million and 
$23,555 ($9,173) million, respectively. Our sample firms are profitable, reporting both 
mean and median return on assets of approximately 5%. Consistent with other 
compensation and tax planning studies, our sample firms are highly levered, with a mean 
(median) debt-to-assets ratio of 20% (18%). Finally, our sample firms report mean 
taxable income of $1,270 billion on pre-tax income of $1,838 million. Thus, our sample 
is composed of very large firms that (as we will see in Section 5) have sizeable tax 
burdens and, therefore, a relatively greater proclivity to engage a tax director for tax 
planning. 
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5. Variable Measurement and Methodological Approach 
5.1. Executive incentives 
      We have detailed data about the annual salary, annual bonus, annual restricted 
stock and option grants, and expected payouts from long-term incentive plans (e.g., stock 
options, restricted stock, performance units, and performance shares) for each executive 
in our sample. We use this information to calculate two complementary measures of 
incentive compensation. Our first measure is the total value of annual executive 
compensation, which is computed as the sum of all of the components of compensation, 
where restricted stock is valued using the market value at the date of the grant and stock 
options are valued using the Black-Scholes risk-neutral value.11 This approach provides 
one measure of an agent’s incentives, since total annual flow compensation should vary 
with performance measures that are used in the compensation contract (Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987). Our second measure is compensation mix, which is defined the ratio of 
variable compensation (i.e., bonus, stock options, restricted stock, performance units, and 
performance shares) to total compensation.12 Compensation mix is a measure of variable 
remuneration, or how much an executive shares in the actual performance of the firm. 
Compensation mix is commonly used in consulting practice as a measure of managerial 
                                                 
11 The parameters of the Black-Scholes formula are calculated as follows. Annualized volatility is 
calculated using continuously compounded monthly returns over the prior 36 months (with a minimum of 
12 months of returns). The risk-free rate is calculated using the interpolated interest rate on a Treasury 
Note, with the same maturity (to the closest month) as the remaining life of the option, multiplied by 0.7 to 
account for the prevalence of early exercise. Dividend yield is calculated as the dividends paid over the past 
12 months scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the month. This is essentially the same method 
described by Core and Guay (2002). 
12 We also disaggregate this ratio into bonus mix and equity mix, defined as the ratio of the annual bonus to 
total compensation and the ratio of the value of the current year’s stock and option grants to total 
compensation, respectively. For the sake of brevity, we do not report results from using these variables 
instead of compensation mix, but we find that they are generally similar to those with compensation mix 
which suggests that the incentives are not uniquely attributable to either the bonus or equity grants. 
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incentives and is similar to the measure used in prior studies such as Ittner et al. (2003) 
and Erickson et al. (2006).13,14   
      Descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 reveal that the mean (median) total level 
compensation ranges from $13,662,000 ($9,839,090) for the CEO to $787,727 
($558,714) for the tax director. The high level of CEO compensation is expected, since 
our sample generally consists of very large firms. In terms of compensation mix, the 
mean (median) for the CEO is 0.85 (0.90) and 0.59 (0.63) for the tax director. The tax 
director compensation mix is primarily attributable to equity (45% = 59% less 14% of 
bonus) and suggests that the tax director’s duties extend beyond compliance. If the tax 
director’s work were simply compliance, which is readily observable, there should be 
little difficulty (and, hence, less need to use incentive-based compensation) in 
ascertaining whether compliance tasks were performed adequately. 
5.2. Effective tax rates 
We begin by examining the GAAP and Cash effective tax rates. The GAAP 
effective tax rate is the ratio of total tax expense to pre-tax book income (TXT/PI). It is 
composed of a current and deferred component. Although the current tax expense is an 
                                                 
13 The incentives literature also uses the equity portfolio delta (e.g., Core and Guay, 1999) as a measure of 
executive incentives. This measure captures the change in the risk-neutral value of an executive’s firm-
specific equity portfolio holdings for a 1% change in the price of the underlying stock. One limitation of 
our data set is that it does not provide information about the firm-specific equity holdings of the executives, 
and we are therefore precluded from calculating the equity portfolio delta for either the tax director or the 
other executives. We suspect that the equity ownership by the tax director is modest and, thus, that 
analyzing the current year’s compensation and compensation mix will be a reasonable proxy of managerial 
incentives. In addition, because we have information about the equity portfolio holdings of the CEO and 
CEO, we repeat all of our tabulated analyses using equity portfolio delta as the measure of the incentives of 
these two executives and we find that our primary results are essentially unchanged.  
14 An alternative approach is to adopt a two-stage research design in which we first regress either the 
executive’s total compensation or variable compensation mix on the economic determinants of incentive 
compensation, and then use the residual from this regression in a second-stage model of the various tax 
attributes of interest (BTG, GAAP and Cash ETR, etc.). The use of this alternative measure produces results 
that are substantively equivalent to those reported in the tables. 
 
 16
estimate of the current taxes owed to the tax authorities, it does not include the tax benefit 
from stock options until the post-FAS123R period. Deferred tax expense captures the tax 
implications of differences between book and tax accrual accounting. Consistent with 
other studies (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2008), Table 2 reports that mean (median) GAAP ETR is 
about 30% (31%). A GAAP effective tax rate lower than the statutory tax rates implies 
that firms have income included in book income that will never be recorded in taxable 
income (e.g., municipal bond interest and permanently reinvested earnings).15  
We model the ETR as a function of both economic variables that have been suggested 
by prior literature (see below) and the incentives of the firm’s key executives. We specify 
the model as follows. 
ETRi,t = β0 + β1Incentivesi,t + β2Return-onAssetsi,t + β3Std Dev.ROAi,t + β4Log(Market Cap)i,t 
+ β5Leveragei,t + β6Change in Goodwilli,t + β7NewInvestmenti,t + β8Foreign Assetsi,t 
+ β9GeographicComplexityi,t + β10IndustryComplexityi,t  +  β11Proportion Tax Fees 
i,t + β12TaxFeesi,t + YearIndicators + IndustryIndicators + εi,t               (1) 
where ETR is either the GAAP or Cash effective tax rate. The Cash ETR measures the 
current cash outflows for income taxes as a percentage of pre-tax book income ((TXPD + 
(TXBCO + TXBCOF)) / PI).16 Unlike the GAAP ETR, the Cash ETR reflects deferral of 
cash tax payments. Table 2 reveals that the mean (median) Cash ETR is 29% (23%), 
                                                 
15 Note that ETR differentials, such as tax credits, also drive down the effective tax rate as they effectively 
represent a difference of (1-τ)/τ between book and taxable income. 
16 Unlike Dyreng et al. (2008), our measure of the cash effective tax rate considers the impact of stock 
options and special items. First, we view the cash benefit of stock options as a de facto cash payment for 
income taxes. Note that the tax benefit of options reduces the cash outflow for income taxes without any 
corresponding adjustment to book income. Hence, in the pre-SFAS 123R period, a firm that chooses to 
compensate employees with equity rather than cash will report a lower Cash ETR, not because the firm has 
a lower cash payment for taxes but because its book income does not include any compensation expense. 
The expensing of stock options under FAS 123R alleviates much this measurement error, but since our 
sample spans SFAS 123R adoption, it is critical for us to account for this issue. Second, Dyreng et al.’s 
exclusion of special items from the denominator leads to downwardly biased estimates of the cash effective 
tax rates as 73% of the special items reported in Compustat between 2002 and 2006 are income decreasing. 
In Table 2, we also report descriptive statistics on Cash ETR w/o option benefit, which excludes the tax 
benefit from stock options in the numerator. The mean and median values of this measure of the cash 
effective tax rate are slightly lower than the mean and median values of Cash ETR. 
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which suggests that our sample has accruals that increase pre-tax book income but not 
taxable income. Note that both the GAAP and Cash ETRs are censored to fall between 
zero and one.17 Incentives are the incentives of the CEO, tax director, general counsel, 
and CFO, respectively, measured as either total annual compensation or compensation 
mix (described in Section 5.1). In addition, all independent variables are winsorized at the 
1% level to ameliorate the effect of influential observations on the results. Since both 
dependent variables are bound in the (closed) interval [0,1], we estimate the models using 
a doubly censored Tobit specification to eliminate bias that would otherwise result from 
OLS estimation.18  Finally, since prior studies have documented substantial variation in 
ETRs across industries and over time, we include year and industry indicator variables to 
capture the average effect of this variation. 
5.2.1. Economic controls 
    We include Return on Assets (net income over beginning total assets) to control 
for the underlying economic activity of the firm. We include the standard deviation of the 
previous five years’ ROA (Std Dev. ROA) to capture variability in the firm’s operations. 
Next we include a size proxy, the natural logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization 
(Log(Market Cap)). Prior studies’ evidence on the relationship between GAAP ETR and 
firm size is mixed. For example, Rego (2003), Zimmerman (1983), and Omer et al. 
(1993) document a negative relationship between firm size and GAAP ETR, a finding that 
                                                 
17 The fraction of GAAP (Cash) ETRs that are truncated at zero and one are 6.9% (6.7%) and 1.2% (2.7%), 
respectively. Since these two variables are censored both below and above, we used a doubly censored 
Tobit in our analysis of the ETRs. 
18 All tabulated specifications were also estimated using ordinary least squares and produced almost 
identical results, which is not surprising given the relatively low fraction of observations that are censored 
at either end of the [0,1] interval. It can be shown that OLS estimates will be identical to those from a 
doubly censored Tobit when there are no censored observations. In addition, we report tabulated results 
from OLS estimation, since doing so facilitates the interpretation of the marginal effects of the coefficient 
estimates.  
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is consistent with the “political cost” hypothesis. However, Jacob (1996), Gupta and 
Newberry (1997), and Mills et al. (1998) do not find a statistically significant 
relationship. We therefore include firm size but do not predict the sign of the relationship. 
Leverage, defined as the ratio of the firm’s long-term debt to total assets (LT/AT), is 
included to capture the extent of the tax shield of debt. Ceteris paribus, the greater the 
firm’s tax shield of debt, the lower the need for incremental tax planning (see Mackie-
Mason, 1990). Change in Goodwill, defined as the annual increase in the firm’s goodwill 
scaled by beginning total assets (∆GDWL/Beginning AT), is included to capture merger 
and acquisition activity of the firm during the year. If goodwill decreases, then Change in 
Goodwill is set to zero. New Investment, defined in Richardson (2006) as the sum of 
research and development expense, capital expenditures, and acquisitions less the sum of 
sales of property and depreciation all scaled by total assets ((XRD + CAPX + ACQ – 
SPPE – DPC) / Avg. AT), is included to control for the firm’s investment activity, since 
investment often leads to book-tax differences because the tax and accounting rules are 
different (e.g., the investment tax credit, accelerated depreciation methods, and bonus 
depreciation).19  
Rego (2003) finds that multinational firms with more extensive foreign operations 
have lower worldwide GAAP ETRs, a finding that she interprets as being consistent with 
economies of scale in tax planning. We therefore include the foreign assets of the 
company to control for differences in international planning opportunities. Foreign Assets 
are estimated using the methodology described in Oler et al. (2007), which uses the 
consolidated turnover ratio and foreign segment sales to infer foreign assets. We include 
                                                 
19 Notice that New Investment captures cash-based M&A activity, whereas the Change in Goodwill 
captures taxable and non-taxable M&A activity. 
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an estimate of the firm’s foreign asset base to capture differential tax rates that typically 
apply to firms’ foreign activities.  
Finally, since more complex organizations require more executive talent (which 
commands higher pay) and more opportunity to tax plan, we include two measures of the 
complexity of the organization: Geographic Complexity and Industry Complexity. 
Following Bushman et al. (2004), these measures are revenue-based Hirfindahl-
Hirschman indices that capture the within-firm geographic and industry segment 
concentration of the firm. Lower values of these measures suggest a relatively more 
complex organization, so we predict a negative association between these measures of 
complexity and the ETR consistent with more opportunity for tax planning. 
5.2.2. External tax planning 
Firms may choose to use external providers for tax planning, which might weaken 
the link between tax director incentive compensation and measures of tax planning. We 
include two proxies for the extent of a firm’s use of tax consulting services. Tax Fees is 
the total tax fees paid to a firm’s external auditor scaled by total assets as reported by 
Audit Analytics.20 The greater a firm’s tax fees are relative to its size, the more likely the 
firm has contracted with its auditor for tax planning purposes. Proportion Tax Fees is that 
ratio of tax fees to total fees paid to the external auditor. The greater this ratio, the more 
emphasis a firm places on tax planning and reporting. Measures of external tax services 
could either be positively or negatively associated with measures of tax planning. If a 
firm faces a relatively high tax burden, then external tax consultants could be engaged to 
help the tax director. On the other hand, the firm may have a relatively low tax burden 
                                                 
20 Note that to the extent the firm utilizes non-auditor tax consulting services, our Tax Fees measure will 
underestimate the extent to which the firm obtains outside tax assistance.  
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because external tax consultants were engaged. Hence, we make no prediction on the 
direction of the association with measures of tax planning. 
5.3. Book-tax gap 
      The next tax attribute we examine is the book-tax gap (BTG) because, assuming 
the BTG reflects tax planning, we can use the BTG and its components to investigate both 
conforming and non-conforming tax planning. If, after controlling for firm performance, 
the tax director’s compensation is associated with a smaller book-tax gap, then we can 
infer that the tax director is compensated for managing taxable income in a manner that 
avoids the scrutiny of the tax authorities (Mills 1998). On the other hand, as firms face 
taxes in multiple jurisdictions, we conjecture that the BTG may better capture “tax 
planning” by measuring activity that reduces pre-tax income.21 If tax directors have 
incentives to reduce taxable income even at the expense of reducing book income (i.e., 
conforming tax planning), then we should observe either a negative or no association 
with the BTG and a negative association with both taxable income and pre-tax book 
income. On the other hand, non-conforming tax planning may manifest in a positive 
association between the incentive compensation of the tax director and the BTG.  
We model the book-tax gap as a function of both economic variables that have 
been suggested by prior literature and the incentives of the firm’s key executives. We 
specify the model as follows. 
                                                 
21 For example, consider two firms, A and B, that both have a foreign affiliate that generates 50% of the 
consolidated entity’s income (with the other 50% generated by the domestic parent). Suppose the tax rate in 
A’s affiliate is 40% and the rate in B’s affiliate is 20%. Further suppose that firm A’s tax director shelters 
20% of its affiliate’s income. However, B’s tax director shelters only 10% of its affiliate’s income. It is 
unclear which firm has the “better” tax director. On an after-tax basis, Firm B has a lower GAAP ETR 
(assuming PRE designation under APB 23) and Cash ETR. Yet Firm A’s tax director has generated a 
“larger” book tax difference. This is the reason we consider the BTG tests as capturing “pre-tax” tax 
planning.  
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BTGi,t = β0 + β1Incentives i,t + β2 Operating Cash Flow i,t + β3Std Dev. ROAi,t + 
β4log(Market Capi,t) + β5Leveragei,t + β6Change in Goodwilli,t + β7New 
Investmenti,t + β8ForeignAssetsi,t +  β9Geographic Complexityi,t + β10Industry 
Complexityi,t  +  β11Proportion Tax Fees i,t + β12TaxFeesi,t + Year Indicators + 
Industry Indicators + εi,t                                 (2) 
where BTG is the book-tax gap measured globally and scaled by total assets at the 
beginning of the period. The BTG is measured as the difference between pre-tax income 
less income attributable to minority interest (Compustat PI – MII) and taxable income 
(defined as current federal tax expense (TXFED) grossed up by the maximum federal 
statutory tax rate (i.e., 35%) plus pre-tax foreign income (PIFO) less the annual change in 
NOLs (NOL)) scaled (by total assets).22 Incentives are the incentives of the CEO, tax 
director, general counsel and CFO, respectively, measured as either the level of 
compensation or compensation mix. Similar to equation (1), it is necessary to specify the 
appropriate control variables for the BTG. We rely on the same controls as those included 
in equation (1) except that we replace Return on Assets, which is effectively a component 
of our measure of the BTG, with Cash Flow From Operations scaled by average assets to 
control for the underlying economic activity of the firm. All of the remaining variables 
are as defined above.  
5.3.1 Components of the book-tax gap 
                                                 
22  We adjust for the minority interest on the assumption that it represents a greater than 20% ownership 
stake by the minority. We continue to find similar results if we do not remove the minority interest. In 
addition, we estimate foreign taxable income by using reported pretax income, which implicitly assumes a 
relatively high level of book-tax conformity on foreign jurisdictions. Most studies estimate taxable income 
by grossing up current foreign tax expense by the top U.S. statutory rate, which biases taxable income 
(BTG) downward (upward) since foreign statutory tax rates are typically lower than U.S. rates. Finally, we 
ignore the tax benefit of stock options (TXBCO + TXBCOF) in our estimate of the BTG because the 
benefit of options was a known difference between book and taxable income during the majority of our 
sample period. The tax benefit of options, however, is considered in our measures of taxable income in 
later analyses. We presume that employee stock option exercise activity is exogenous to tax planning 
(barring extreme instances such as the one described in Matsunaga, Shevlin, and Shores, 1992). Ideally, in 
our BTG analysis, we would eliminate all differences between book income and tax income unrelated to tax 
planning. 
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Table 2 shows that the mean book-tax gap is 5.0% of total assets for our sample.23 
The positive value indicates that book income is greater than taxable income. Although 
the book-tax gap is an important tax construct, there are both economic and econometric 
reasons why the book-tax gap might be problematic as a dependent variable. The book-
tax gap is measured as the difference between pre-tax book income and estimated taxable 
income, and each of its two components might exhibit a different relationship with the 
independent variables included in equation (1). From an economic perspective, the book-
tax gap itself might not be the construct of interest because some executives influence the 
measure indirectly (e.g., the CEO's setting of the firm’s investment policy) and others 
directly (e.g., the smoothing earnings by the CFO). Since we are specifically interested in 
the direct links between tax planning and managerial incentives, we disaggregate the 
book-tax gap into its two components and jointly estimate both equations using 
seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962). Joint estimation of the two resulting 
equations also allows us to formally compare coefficients across the two equations.  
Disaggregating the book-tax gap into its components also allows us to investigate 
whether there is evidence of conforming tax planning. When a firm undertakes 
conforming tax planning, book income will be reduced because the firm seeks to lower 
taxable income. Since large book-tax differences may draw the attention of the tax 
authorities, firms may be willing to undertake conforming tax planning because it 
increases the likelihood that the firm will prevail under audit (Mills, 1998; Cloyd, Pratt, 
and Stock, 1996).  
5.4. Specific measures of “tax aggressiveness” 
                                                 
23 Untabulated analysis reveals that the mean BTG for our sample is positive for all years during our sample 
period. We also find that the mean BTG is positive for the firms in the S&P500 during each year of our 
sample period. 
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The final tax attribute that we examine is tax aggressiveness. As discussed above, 
there is no generally accepted definition of this construct, and it is thus difficult to 
measure. Nevertheless, we investigate two recently developed measures of tax 
aggressiveness: Frank et al.’s (2009) DTAX and Wilson’s (2009) SHELTER. Frank et al. 
(2009 p. 468) define “aggressive tax reporting” as “a downward manipulation of taxable 
income through tax planning that may or may not be considered fraudulent tax evasion.” 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that for public companies, the ideal tax planning 
transactions are those that create permanent differences.24 By creating permanent 
differences, the firm reduces cash taxes paid without decreasing financial statement 
income.  
To investigate whether incentives are associated with permanent differences and 
ETR differentials (hereafter “perm diffs” for expositional simplicity), we begin by 
computing a modified version of Frank et al.’s (2009) DTAX measure of discretionary 
perm diffs. Frank et al. (2009) compute DTAX as the residuals from a regression of an 
estimate of perm diffs on measures of intangible assets, income of unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, minority interest, state tax burdens, changes in NOLs, and lagged perm 
diffs. We modify this computation by including Oler et al.’s (2007) measure of foreign 
assets (Foreign Assets) to control for the existence of multinational operations. By 
including Foreign Assets in the first stage, we attempt to control for ETR differentials 
that result from “ordinary” overseas operations. Without this modification, DTAX would 
                                                 
24 The 1999 Treasury White Paper on corporate tax shelters noted the following: “There is a current trend 
among public companies to treat corporate in-house tax departments as profit centers that strive to keep the 
corporation’s effective tax rate low and in line with that of competitors. Accordingly, in most recent 
corporate tax shelters involving public companies, the financial accounting treatment of the shelter item has 
been inconsistent with the claimed federal income tax treatment.” See McGill and Outslay (2004) for 
further discussion of the prevalence of permanent difference creation in tax shelter arrangements. 
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suggest that firms with extensive foreign operations or foreign operations in low tax 
jurisdictions are always more aggressive tax planners.25 Table 2 reports that the mean 
(median) DTAX is 7.5% (0.30%) of total assets. Positive levels of DTAX indicate that our 
sample firms have discretionary perm diffs that reduce taxable income relative to the 
population of Compustat firms that are used to estimate DTAX. 
We investigate whether executives have incentives to engage in creating 
permanent differences by estimating the following model: 
DTAXi,t = γ0 + γ1Incentivesi,t + γ2Return-on-Assetsi,t + γ3Std Dev. ROAi,t + γ4log(Market 
Capi,t)+ γ5Leveragei,t  + γ6Change in Goodwilli + γ7NewInvestmenti,t + γ8Foreign 
Assetsi,t + γ9 GeographicComplexityi,t + γ 10IndustryComplexityi,t  +  
γ11Proportion Tax Fees i,t + γ 12TaxFeesi,t +  νi,t                            (3) 
where the variables are as defined above. 
 Finally, we investigate whether tax director incentives are associated with the 
predicted presence of tax shelters. We estimate Wilson’s (2009) SHELTER measure 
which was developed using a sample of approximately 60 firms identified in court 
documents as having participated in illegal tax shelters. We use the following model to 
determine whether tax director incentives are associated with a high probability of 
sheltering behavior. 
SHELTERi,t = γ0 + γ1Incentivesi,t + γ2Return-on-Assetsi,t + γ3Std Dev. ROAi,t  
+ γ4log(Market Capi,t)+ γ5Leveragei,t  + γ6Change in Goodwilli  
+ γ7NewInvestmenti,t + γ8Foreign Assetsi,t + γ9 GeographicComplexityi,t + 
γ10IndustryComplexityi,t  +  γ11Proportion Tax Fees i,t + γ 12TaxFeesi,t + νi,t             (4) 
                                                 
25 Note that Frank et al.’s measure, DTAX, implicitly assumes that any variation in perm diffs that does not 
result from the “known” sources of perm diffs included in the first stage (i.e., change in NOL, minority 
interest income, state income taxes, intangibles, and unconsolidated subsidiaries) are the result of tax 
planning. We conjecture that foreign operations are another source of perm diffs that are not necessarily 
discretionary tax planning and are therefore not necessarily indicative of aggressive behavior. Accordingly, 
we modify Frank et al.’s DTAX measure by also including foreign assets in the first-stage regression. 
Nevertheless, all of our reported results are robust to excluding foreign assets and measuring DTAX 
exactly as described by Frank et al.  
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6. Results 
6.1. GAAP ETR 
 The results of estimating equation (1) where the GAAP ETR is the dependent 
variable are presented in Table 3. We first consider the role of the level of compensation, 
which is presented in columns (1) and (2). In the first model, where all of the positions 
are simultaneously considered, we find a strong negative relationship between tax 
director compensation and the GAAP ETR, but no significant relationship with the other 
three executives. This strong negative relationship continues to hold when we estimate 
the model considering only the tax executive.26  
When we measure incentives as compensation mix in columns (3) and (4), we 
again find a strong negative relationship between tax director incentives and the GAAP 
ETR when all executives are considered together. We continue to find a negative 
relationship when only the tax director’s incentives are included in the analysis (i.e. 
column 4). Overall, the evidence presented in Table 3 provides strong support for the 
notion that tax directors, but not the CEO, general counsel, and CFO have incentives to 
manage the GAAP ETR.  
We also find a significant relationship between the GAAP ETR and certain control 
variables included in the specification. In particular, Return on Assets is significantly 
positive which indicates that more profitable firms have higher GAAP ETRs. Our proxy 
for the operating risk, Std. Dev. ROA, is negative and significant, consistent with 
convexity in the tax function (i.e., losses can reduce future earnings). Foreign Assets is 
positive and is generally significant, suggesting that firms with greater multinational 
                                                 
26 When we include the incentives of each of the other executives (CEO, CFO, GC) alone in the model, 
they are never significant. 
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activities have higher GAAP ETRs. Although we expected foreign activity to give rise to 
lower tax liabilities, our results are consistent with foreign investment being correlated 
with future profitability. Geographical Complexity is positive and significant, suggesting 
that firms with more dispersed geographic operations have lower effective tax rates. 
Consistent with Mills, Erickson, and Maydew (1998), we also we find that a higher 
ProportionTaxFees is associated relatively lower GAAP ETRs, which is consistent with 
the presence of more sophisticated tax planning.  
Interestingly, these results suggest that tax directors are compensated on the basis 
of after-tax financial reporting measures rather than pre-tax measures. In particular, since 
we find no association between taxable income and tax director incentives, the negative 
relationship with the GAAP ETR is consistent with tax directors’ undertaking of tax 
planning involving permanent differences and ETR differentials. Thus, our results 
corroborate Robinson et al.’s (2010) finding that firms provide incentives to the tax 
department to mitigate the impact of taxes on bottom-line net income.  
6.2. Cash ETR 
The results of estimating equation (1) with the Cash ETR are presented in Table 3, 
columns (5) through (8), and parallel our analysis of the GAAP ETR. When we consider 
the level of compensation as the measure of incentives in columns (5) and (6), we fail to 
find a significant relationship between the incentives of any of the executives and the 
Cash ETR. When compensation mix is used as the measure of incentives in columns (7) 
and (8), we again find no relationship between executive incentives and the Cash ETR in 
any of the specifications.27  
                                                 
27 When we use the leading three-year average Cash ETR, Cash ETR (3 year), as the dependent variables, 
we find no association with our various measures of incentives. Note that this analysis reduces our sample 
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We document several significant relationships between the cash effective tax rate 
and the control variables. Return on Assets is significantly positive which indicates that 
more profitable firms have higher cash effective tax rates. Std ROA is negative and 
significant, consistent with the finding that a greater variation in a firm’s earnings results 
in a lower Cash ETR because of the convexity in the statutory rate structure. Change in 
Goodwill is positively related to the Cash ETR, a finding that suggests that M&A activity 
leads to lower pre-tax book income with no corresponding reduction to cash taxes paid 
(e.g., in-process R&D). Finally, we find that, consistent with the presence of incremental 
tax incentives, New Investment exhibits a negative and significant relationship with Cash 
ETR. 
Overall, the lack of a relationship between tax director incentives and Cash ETR 
is in sharp contrast to the strong negative relationship for the GAAP ETR presented in 
Table 3.28 Collectively, these results suggest that tax directors have incentives to reduce 
the GAAP ETR. One agency-theoretic explanation for this result is that the contracting 
weight on a performance measure is a function of its signal-to-noise ratio (Holmstrom, 
1979; Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Banker and Datar, 1989; Lambert, 2001). 
Accordingly, an increase in either the sensitivity of the performance measure to the 
agent’s actions (i.e., the strength of the signal about the agent’s actions), or a decrease in 
its conditional variance (i.e., the noise with which it reflects the agent’s actions) will, 
ceteris paribus, increase the relative weight placed on the performance measure in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
to 772 firm years, since we are unable to estimate Cash ETR (3 year) for 2006. The negative association 
between GAAP ETR and tax director incentives continues to hold in this reduced sample.  
28 To alleviate concerns that our GAAP ETR results are driven solely by tax accounting accruals, we have 
collected data on firms’ valuation allowance and cushion activity for a random subsample of our firms. 
When we include the change in the valuation allowance and/or cushion, we continue to find a significant 
negative (no) association between the tax director’s compensation (both levels and mix) and the GAAP 
(Cash) ETR. 
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optimal compensation contract. From a “signal” perspective, the GAAP ETR is likely to 
be more sensitive to the tax director’s actions than the Cash ETR is, because, unlike the 
Cash ETR, it contains an accrual component that estimates the future effects of actions in 
the current period.29 From a “noise” perspective, the Cash ETR of our sample firms 
exhibits more variation than does the GAAP ETR (Table 2 reports that the standard 
deviation of Cash (GAAP) ETR is 26.2% (14.8%)). This is likely attributable to the 
discrete nature of items such as option exercises and tax audit cash outflows, which is 
undesirable from a contracting perspective.30 Thus, our results are consistent with the 
GAAP ETR being a more informative measure of the tax director’s actions, and, 
accordingly, it is allocated more weight in the incentive compensation contract. 
Our results could also be construed as consistent with firms potentially forgoing 
cash savings to gain financial reporting benefits (e.g., Engel et al., 1999; Erickson et al., 
2004). Finally, our results also corroborate Robinson et al.’s (2010) finding of little to no 
association between the profit center motive of the firm’s tax department and Cash ETR. 
6.3. Book-tax gap and its components 
The results of the book-tax gap analysis are presented in Table 4. We find no 
relationship between the book-tax gap and either the level of compensation or the 
compensation mix of any of the executives. In addition, we find no relationship between 
the incentives of the tax director and either the PBI or TI component of the BTG.  
                                                 
29 In a multiperiod contracting setting, a number of authors such as Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) show that 
accruals are valuable for contracting because they provide a current (albeit noisy) estimate of the future 
cash flows generated by the agent’s actions in the current period. Accordingly, accruals are useful for 
overcoming agency problems that result from differences in discount rates between the principal and agent. 
30 This idea is a manifestation of the controllability principal from agency theory. Lambert (2001, p. 23) 
defines a performance measure as “controllable” if “the agent’s actions influence the probability 
distribution of that variable.” To the extent that a performance measure that is not controllable by the agent 
is used in the compensation contract, it imposes additional risk on the agent for which he or she must be 
compensated. 
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In terms of the control variables, the positive association between BTG and 
Operating Cash Flow suggests that more profitable firms have a greater wedge between 
book and taxable income. When the dependent variable is pre-tax book (taxable) income, 
in all models, the estimated coefficient on cash flows of approximately 0.84 (0.59) 
indicates that pre-tax book (taxable) income is, on average, roughly 16% (41%) lower 
than cash flows from operations. The positive relationship between log(Market 
Capitalization) and measures of firm performance (PBI and TI) is consistent with 
profitable firms being more valuable. In addition, the negative association between 
Industry Complexity and the BTG suggests that firms with more variation in industry 
composition have greater book-tax gaps. However, consistent with earnings management, 
the association appears to stem from the fact that these firms have relatively higher pre-
tax book income. 
Overall, the results of the taxable income specification support the notion that 
there is little cross-sectional variation in the executives’ incentives to reduce taxable 
income, at least as we can estimate this measure. As our sample is composed of large 
public firms, it is likely that these firms are averse to tax planning opportunities that 
reduce both book and tax income.  
6.4. Measures of “tax aggressiveness” 
Our final set of results relates to tax aggressiveness and is presented in Table 5. 
Using the level of compensation as our measure of incentives, we find no relationship 
between executive incentives and Frank et al.’s (2009) measure of discretionary 
permanent differences/ETR differentials. We also fail to find a correlation between any 
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of the measures of executive incentives and Wilson’s (2009) measure of sheltering 
behavior (SHELTER).31  
We document several significant relationships between the measures of tax 
aggressiveness and the control variables. Interestingly, we find that DTAX is positively 
associated with Change in Goodwill, a finding that is consistent with increases in 
permanent differences around M&A activity. The negative association between DTAX 
and New Investment suggests that firms with relatively more new depreciation deductions 
have smaller discretionary permanent differences. Finally, Proportion Tax Fees is 
significantly positively related to DTAX, a finding that suggests that hiring the firm’s 
auditor for tax services complements “aggressive” tax planning.  
Return on Assets exhibits a positive and significant relationship with SHELTER 
which indicates that more profitable firms have greater predicted probability of 
participating in tax shelters. We also find that SHELTER is positively related to the size 
of the firm which is consistent with the large fixed costs of entering into shelter 
transactions. The negative association between geographic complexity and SHELTER 
suggests that firms with more foreign affiliates have a higher probability of being 
involved in a tax shelter. However, overall, we find little evidence that the either the 
CEO, tax director, general counsel, or CFO are provided incentives to undertake 
aggressive tax planning as measured by DTAX and SHELTER.32 
                                                 
31 We obtain similar results when we use Compensation Mix as our measure of incentives. We also obtain 
similar results when we include the five variables from the first-stage DTAX specification that are not 
included in equation (3), namely, the ratio of (i) intangible assets to total assets, (ii) earnings of 
subsidiaries, (iii) minority interest income, (iv) state taxes, and (v) change in NOL.  
32 Note that there are limitations of the DTAX and SHELTER measures. First, DTAX measures only 
incremental permanent differences and ETR differentials (“perm diffs”), so, ceteris paribus, a tax director 
that has replaced one perm diff with another (perhaps because of a change in the tax law) will have zero 
DTAX. Second, much of the variation in DTAX could stem from changes in foreign operations. Although 
we include foreign assets in our model of DTAX, we still are not able to control for the tax rates of the 
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7. Sensitivity Analyses 
7.1. Governance characteristics 
 Prior literature such as Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) has shown that 
various governance characteristics are related to firms’ incentive compensation practices. 
In addition, recent research such as Desai and Dharmapala (2006) suggests a link 
between firms’ governance characteristics and the extent to which they engage in 
aggressive tax planning.33 We therefore repeat the analyses above, including a broad 
array of governance variables that have been used in prior research. In particular, prior 
studies linking corporate governance to compensation practices have examined three 
broad categories of governance constructs: (i) board of director characteristics; (ii) Board 
structure; and (iii) state antitakeover laws. We obtain board of director data from the 
Equilar analysis of proxy statements and use six variables to capture board 
characteristics: (i) the number of directors, (ii) the fraction of inside directors, (iii) the 
fraction of directors who are over 69 years old, (iv) the fraction of the board that is 
“busy” (which is measured as serving on at least two additional boards), (v) an indicator 
that equals one if the lead director is classified as affiliated, and zero otherwise, and (vi) 
the fraction of directors classified as outsiders who were appointed after the current 
CEO’s term began.  
                                                                                                                                                 
jurisdictions where the assets are located. Third, variation in DTAX could be attributable to changes in the 
tax contingency that is related to past tax planning instead of current tax planning. Regarding SHELTER, 
the majority of the variation in the measure results from firm size. Since our sample consists almost entirely 
of large firms, there is almost no variation in this measure within our sample (Table 2 reports that the 
interquartile range is from 0.946 to 0.994). Since our tests are cross-sectional, the lack of variation in these 
measures across our sample suggests that this measure produces a low-powered test. 
33 In particular, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) argue that “good governance” increases the link between 
equity compensation and aggressive tax planning.  
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Next, we use data from FactSet SharkRepellent to measure board structure similar 
to Gompers et al. (2003), Daines and Klausner (2001), Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), and 
Faleye (2007). First, we include a set of indicator variables to capture whether the 
company’s board members are elected annually or are elected to staggered, multiyear 
terms.34 We also include an indicator for whether the firm has multiple classes of shares 
with unequal voting rights.  
Finally, similar to Bebchuk et al. (2002), Cheng et al. (2004), and Wahal et al. 
(1995), we include variables for state antitakeover laws. Their results suggest that the 
introduction of stronger antitakeover legislation leads to greater managerial 
entrenchment. Our results (untabulated) are robust to the inclusion of governance metrics. 
Specifically, we continue to find a significant negative relationship between tax director 
incentives and the GAAP ETR and no relationship between tax director incentives and 
BTG, Cash ETR, DTAX, and SHELTER.  
7.2. Reversing the regression 
Prior studies that investigate cross-sectional variation in firms’ tax planning 
model executive compensation as a function of the firm’s tax attributes (e.g., Rego and 
Wilson, 2010; Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). These studies find that higher levels of 
compensation are associated with a higher level of tax aggressiveness. In addition, this 
specification allows researchers to simultaneously evaluate multiple measures of tax 
planning. We therefore estimate regressions of both total compensation and 
compensation mix of the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO on a variety of 
economic controls as well as GAAP ETR and Cash ETR. The results of the total 
                                                 
34 Activist shareholders argue that staggered terms impede shareholders’ monitoring of the Board by 
making it more difficult for them to alter the board’s composition over a short time period. 
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compensation regressions are reported in Table 6, and they reveal that GAAP ETR 
continues to exhibit a strong negative relationship with the level of tax director 
compensation.35 Interestingly, and consistent with our signal-to-noise interpretation of the 
various performance measures, when we replace Cash ETR with Three-year lagged Cash 
ETR, we find a negative (but insignificant) relationship with the level of CEO and tax 
director compensation. This finding suggests that the signal becomes less noisy as the 
window over which Cash ETR is measured lengthens. 
7.3. Matched-pair research design 
      There are two important limitations of the traditional linear regression approach 
used in the preceding tests of the relationship between executive incentives and firm tax 
attributes. First, this approach relies on a linear functional form linking the outcome 
variable of interest (i.e., tax attributes) with both the independent variable of interest (i.e., 
executive compensation) and the other control variables, or “covariates” (e.g., firm size, 
operating performance, and tax professional fees). To the extent that this linearity 
assumption is violated, the model is misspecified and can produce biased coefficient 
estimates. Second, to the extent that there is endogenous matching of executives with 
firms (and compensation contracts) on the basis of some unobserved characteristics (e.g., 
executive risk aversion or talent), this gives rise to traditional correlated omitted variable 
problems and this will bias the parameter estimates obtained from a linear model.  
To mitigate these econometric concerns, we also use a propensity score matched-
pair research design (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 2002; Armstrong et al., 
2009), in which we form matched pairs of firm years that are similar along all of their 
                                                 
35 The coefficient on Cash ETR and GAAP ETR are statistically different for both the tax director (p = 
0.027, two-tail) and the general counsel (p = 0.071, two-tail). 
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(observable) economic characteristics, but most dissimilar in terms of their executives’ 
incentives.36 After matching on these variables, any difference in outcome of interest 
(e.g., BTG, GAAP ETR, Cash ETR, SHELTER, and DTAX) can be more appropriately 
attributed to differences in the level of the executive’s incentives rather than to 
differences in the other variables, regardless of the underlying structural form. We also 
assess the sensitivity of our results to unobserved correlated omitted variables by 
determining the magnitude of the correlated omitted variable bias that is necessary to 
cause any statistically significant differences between matched pairs to become 
insignificant.37 Although this approach does not resolve the endogeneity problem per se, 
the computation enables us to provide some insight into whether our results are robust to 
endogenous matching.       
A formal test of the difference in GAAP ETR between matched pairs is presented 
in Panels A and B of Table 7, respectively. We observe that both higher levels of tax 
director compensation and tax director compensation mix exhibit a strong negative 
relationship with the GAAP ETR (Wilcoxon p-values of 0.0001 and 0.0275, respectively, 
and t-statistic p-values of 0.0005 and 0.0266, respectively). Further, both the mean and 
median differences in the GAAP ETR of -0.029 and -0.018 between the firms with a 
                                                 
36 Our propensity score matched-pair research design requires a model for the conditional probability of 
receiving a given level or mix of compensation given observable features of the contracting environment. 
Consistent with many prior studies, we assume that the choice of the level and mix of compensation are a 
function of the economic and tax planning characteristics discussed in the Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. We also 
required matched pairs to be from the same year and industry. The matched sample was constructed using a 
nonbipartite matching algorithm suggested by Derigs (1988), which is an “optimal” algorithm in the sense 
that it considers the potential distances between other pairs when forming a particular matched pair. The 
matching was done without replacement. 
37 An alternative way of characterizing the correlated omitted variable problem in our setting is that there is 
the potential for endogenous matching (or sorting) of executives and companies. If, for example, executives 
who are relatively more risk-tolerant decide to work for companies that offer more risky, incentive-based 
compensation packages (because these are the executives who are better able to bear the associated risk), 
any observed relationship between executive incentives and certain tax characteristics (e.g., tax 
aggressiveness) could be a result of differences in executive risk-tolerance rather than differences in the 
observed incentives.  
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relatively high and relatively low level of tax director compensation, respectively, and -
0.019 and -0.011 for tax director compensation mix, respectively, are economically 
significant.  
To provide a benchmark of the magnitude of our GAAP ETR results, we also 
provide the propensity score matched-pair analysis for Cash ETR.38 The Cash ETR 
results in Panel B show that none of the incentives variables exhibits a significant 
relationship with the Cash ETR. These results are consistent with the linear regressions 
results presented above and suggest that the relationship is robust to possible 
misspecification of the functional form linking the incentive and control variables with 
the tax outcomes.  
      Similar to all observational studies, our results are susceptible to “hidden bias” if 
there are correlated omitted variables that are not balanced across the two categories. 
Rosenbaum (2002, 2007) develops a bounding approach for assessing the sensitivity of 
the matched-pair results to hidden bias.39 In untabulated sensitivity analysis, we find that 
the results remain statistically significant to the existence of a correlated omitted variable 
that shifts the assignment of executives to the treatment group from a 50%/50% 
probability of being assigned to the high- and low-incentives categories to a 
                                                 
38 Note that a similar propensity score matched-pair analysis of BTG, SHELTER, and DTAX provides no 
evidence that any of these tax attributes exhibits a significant relationship with executive incentive 
compensation.  
39 In our context, hidden bias exists if two executive (denoted i and j) have the same observed (economic 
and tax planning) covariates, but different probabilities (denoted π) of having a particular level of 
incentives. The odds that each executive was assigned to the high- and low-incentives category are denoted 
πi/(1-πi) and πj/(1-πj), respectively. If the odds ratio (following Rosenbaum (2002), denoted by Г), does not 
equal one, then the two executives have an unequal probability of being assigned to a category, and hidden 
bias exists. Rosenbaum (2002) shows that relaxing the assumption that Г = 1 allows for a computation of 
the amount of hidden bias (or, the strength of a correlated omitted variable) that is needed to alter any 
significant inferences. Smaller values of Г indicate statistically significant results that are more sensitive to 
hidden bias.  
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66.5%/33.5% probability assignment.40 Thus, our results are robust to substantive 
correlated omitted variables, and this provides some justification for drawing causal 
inferences regarding the relationship between tax director incentives and GAAP ETRs.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Although tax directors are responsible for one of the firm’s largest outflows of 
cash and one of the largest expenses on the income statement, almost nothing is known 
about how these executives are compensated. To the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first paper to directly study the link between the incentives of tax directors and measures 
of the extent of their firm’s tax planning. Overall, our analyses of the book-tax gap, its 
components, the cash effective tax rate, and alternative measures of “tax aggressiveness” 
provide little evidence that our sample of large, publicly traded firms explicitly 
incentivize their tax function to undertake measures to lower the firm’s contemporaneous 
cash tax burden. Instead, consistent with tax directors receiving incentives to reduce the 
level of tax expense reported in the financial statements, we find that tax executives’ 
compensation is negatively associated with the GAAP ETR. An agency theoretic 
interpretation of this result is that the GAAP ETR is relatively controllable by the tax 
director and can be measured with sufficient precision so as to make it valuable for 
                                                 
40 In other words, the statistical tests conducted in Table 7 are based on the assumption that, conditional on 
the variables in the propensity score model, executives have a 50% probability of being assigned to both 
the treatment and control groups (i.e., the high- and low-incentives groups). If instead, because of some 
correlated omitted variable (e.g., executive risk tolerance), executives with a higher observed level of 
incentive compensation were actually assigned to the treatment group 66.5% of the time and assigned to the 
control group only 33.5% of the time (or Г = 2), a statistically significant difference in the GAAP ETR 
between the two groups would still obtain. Since no strict benchmark exists to determine whether a given Γ 
is “large” or “small,” the designation is inherently subjective and depends on beliefs as to the degree of 
endogenous selection on unobservable factors. Given the extensive controls included in the propensity 
score matching, we believe that it is unlikely that a correlated omitted variable exists that will produce a Г 
> 2. 
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contracting. In contrast, the firm’s other tax attributes are either not sufficiently 
controllable by the tax director and/or are too noisy to be valuable for contracting.  
As with all empirical observational studies, there are several caveats regarding our 
results. First, our sample consists primarily of large profitable U.S. domiciled, 
multinational firms. Accordingly, our results may not generalize to smaller firms. 
Second, the firms in our sample are known to have (highly paid) tax directors. Clearly, 
the presence of a tax director is prima facie evidence of these firms undertaking some 
activity incremental to the duties of the top management team. Therefore, our results do 
not imply that the CEO or CFO is never responsible for the firm’s tax planning function, 
but only that this link is attenuated in the presence of a tax director. Third, like almost all 
prior incentives research, we are unable to directly observe the tax directors’ 
compensation contracts. Therefore, we do know with certainty the precise mechanism(s) 
through which his or her incentives are generated which, in turn, makes causality difficult 
to establish. Fourth, we only investigate the monetary incentives provided to tax 
directors. Tax directors’ (and other executives’) employment might be contingent on 
some other measure of tax planning (e.g., Cash ETR), but the nature of our data inhibits 
our ability to study termination as an incentive mechanism. Finally, we cannot directly 
observe tax planning, so our measures of tax planning undoubtedly include measurement 
error. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source and Data Codes 
Total CEO Compensation, Total 
Tax Director Compensation, 
Total GC Compensation, and 
Total CFO Compensation 
Total annual compensation of the CEO, 
Tax Director, General Counsel, and 
CFO, respectively, where total annual 
compensation is defined as the sum of 
salary, bonus, the market value of target 
long-term incentive payouts, 
perquisites, the market value of 
restricted stock, and the risk-neutral 
(Black-Scholes) value of stock options 
received during the year (with a 70% 
discount applied to the time to 
maturity). 
Proprietary compensation 
consultant data 
CEO Compensation Mix, Tax 
Director Compensation Mix, GC 
Compensation Mix, and CFO 
Compensation Mix 
Ratio of variable compensation (i.e., 
bonus, restricted stock, and stock 
options) to total compensation. 
Proprietary compensation 
consultant data 
CEO Bonus Mix, Tax Director 
Bonus Mix, GC Compensation 
Mix, and CFO Bonus Mix 
Ratio of the annual bonus to total 
compensation.  
Proprietary compensation 
consultant data 
Book-Tax Gap (BTG) Difference between pre-tax book 
income and taxable income. 
Compustat PI less 
TXFED/0.35 less PIFO 
plus ∆TLCF 
Scaled Book-Tax Gap Book-Tax Gap scaled by average Total 
Assets. 
Compustat BTG divided 
by average AT 
GAAP ETR The GAAP effective tax rate for the 
year defined as total income-tax 
expense scaled by pre-tax income.  
Compustat TXT / PI 
Current ETR Current effective tax rate defined as 
total income tax expense less deferred 
income tax expense scaled by pre-tax 
income.  
Compustat ((TXT – 
TXDI) / PI) 
Deferred ETR Deferred effective tax rate defined as 
deferred income tax expense scaled by 
pre-tax income.  
Compustat (TXDI / PI) 
Cash ETR The cash effective tax rate for the year 
defined as the sum of total income taxes 
paid and the tax benefit of stock options 
scaled by pre-tax income.  
Compustat ((TXPD + 
(TXBCO + TXBCOF)) / 
PI) 
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Cash ETR (w/o Option Benefit) Cash effective tax rate excluding the tax 
benefit of stock options.  
Compustat TXPD/ PI 
Cash ETR (3 Year) Three-year Cash ETRs. 3 years leading 
Pre-Tax Book Income Pre-tax income less minority interest. Compustat PI – MII 
Taxable Income Current federal tax expense grossed up 
by the maximum federal statutory tax 
rate plus foreign pre-tax income less the 
change in the firm’s net operating loss 
carryforward.  
Compustat TXFED/0.35 
+ PIFO - ∆TLCF   
Taxable Income (Less Option 
Benefit) 
Taxable income less the tax benefit of 
stock options grossed up by 35%.  
TXFED/0.35 – (TXBCO 
+ TXBCOF)/0.35 + PIFO 
- ∆TLCF   
Cash Flow From Operations Operating cash flows.  Compustat OANCF 
Tax Benefit of Stock Options The tax benefit of stock options not 
included in income. 
Hand collection from 
2002 to 2004, Compustat 
TXBCO + TXBCOF 
2005 and 2006 
DTAX Modified discretionary permanent 
differences and ETR differentials as 
defined in Frank et al. (2009) and 
modified with the inclusion of estimated 
foreign assets. 
Compustat 
SHELTER Probability that the firm engages in a 
tax shelter as defined in Wilson (2009). 
Compustat Tax Shelter  = 
- 4.86 + 5.20*BookTax 
Differences + 
4.08*Discretionary 
Accruals - 1.41*Leverage 
+ 0.76*Size + 3.51*ROA 
+ 1.72*ForeignIncome + 
2.42*R&D 
Market-to-Book Ratio Market capitalization over the book 
value of Total Shareholders’ Equity. 
Compustat (CSHO * 
PRCC_F) / (AT – LT) 
Market Capitalization The number of common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the price per 
share at the fiscal-year end.  
Compustat CSHO * 
PRCC_F 
Revenue Total net sales. Compustat SALE 
Return on Assets Net income (or loss) scaled by 
beginning total assets.  
Compustat NIt / ATt-1 
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Prior Year’s Return Cumulative return on the firm’s stock 
price over the previous year. 
CRSP RET 
Std. Dev. ROA Standard deviation of Return on Assets 
over the previous five fiscal years. 
Std dev(Compustat NIt / 
ATt-1) 
Prior Year’s Volatility The volatility of the firm’s monthly 
stock returns over the previous year. 
CRSP RET 
Leverage Long-term debt over total assets.  Compustat LT / AT 
Change in Goodwill The annual change in goodwill if 
greater than 0; otherwise 0. 
Compustat (∆GDWL/ 
Avg AT) 
New Investment The annual investment as described in 
Richardson (2007) and defined as 
Research and Development expense 
plus Capital Expenditures plus 
Acquisitions minus Sale of Property 
minus Depreciation all scaled by 
average Total Assets.  
Compustat ((XRD + 
CAPX + ACQ – SPPE – 
DPC) / Avg. AT) 
Foreign Assets Estimated foreign assets using the 
methodology described in Oler et al. 
(2007) over Total Assets. 
Compustat  
Geographic Complexity Estimated as the revenue-based 
Hirfindahl-Hirschman indices 
calculated as the sum of the squares of 
each geographic segment’s sales as a 
percentage of the total firm sales as 
described in Bushman et al. (2004). 
Compustat 
Industry Complexity Estimated as the revenue-based 
Hirfindahl-Hirschman indices 
calculated as the sum of the squares of 
each industry segment’s sales as a 
percentage of the total firm sales as 
described in Bushman et al. (2004). 
Compustat 
Audit Fees Total annual audit fees (in $millions) 
paid by the firm. 
Audit Analytics 
Tax Fees Total annual tax fees (in $millions) paid 
by the firm over total assets. 
Audit Analytics 
Proportion Tax Fees Total annual tax fees (in $millions) paid 
by the firm over audit fees. 
Audit Analytics 
All compensation and control variables are measured as of time t except where specified. Dependent 
variables (ETRs, taxable income, BTG, etc.) are computed at time t+1. 
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Table 1 
Panel A:  Industry Composition of Sample 
 Proprietary Sample  Compustat 
Industry Number Frequency  Number Frequency 
1. Mining and Construction 23 1.98%  1,263 2.75% 
2. Food 82 7.06%  859 1.87% 
3. Textiles, Printing, and Publishing   74 6.37%  1,568 3.42% 
4. Chemicals 80 6.88%  955 2.08% 
5. Pharmaceuticals 57 4.91%  2,719 5.93% 
6. Extractive Industries 36 3.10%  1,686 3.67% 
7. Durable Manufacturers 277 23.84%  12,518 27.28% 
8. Computers 28 2.41%  2,338 5.09% 
9. Transportation 43 3.70%  2,907 6.33% 
10. Utilities 72 6.20%  1,797 3.92% 
11. Retail 137 11.79%  3,595 7.83% 
12. Financial Institutions 174 14.97%  6,806 14.83% 
13. Insurance and Real Estate 59 5.08%  2,096 4.57% 
14. Services 2 0.17%  3,862 8.42% 
15. Other 18 1.55%  920 2.00% 
     Total 1,162 100%  45,889 100.00% 
This table presents the industry classification of the proprietary sample and the Compustat database over 
the 2002 to 2006 period. The number and frequency of the 1,162 sample firm-year observations and the 
Compustat database from 2002 to 2006 are reported according to their industry classification following 
Barth et al. (1998).  
 
 
 
Panel B:  Proportion of Sample Tax Expense and Cash Paid for Taxes 
 Ratio of Proprietary Sample to 
Compustat 
Ratio of Proprietary Sample in S&P500 to 
Total S&P500 
 
Assets 
Tax 
Expense 
Cash Paid 
for Taxes 
# of 
Firms Assets 
Tax 
Expense 
Cash Paid 
for Taxes 
2002 31.07% 36.05% 34.61% 50.80% 64.78% 64.67% 62.96% 
2003 30.32% 32.55% 32.09% 50.80% 64.64% 61.35% 62.55% 
2004 29.03% 28.35% 32.94% 51.20% 64.19% 58.61% 60.72% 
2005 28.84% 28.93% 36.27% 50.60% 62.51% 57.43% 58.26% 
2006 28.09% 28.45% 33.86% 49.20% 60.83% 55.26% 56.28% 
Columns (1) to (3) of this table present the ratio of total assets (TA), total tax expense (TXT), and total cash 
paid for taxes (TXPD) for the proprietary sample to the total Compustat population of firms with data 
available, respectively. Columns (4) to (7) present the percentage of the S&P 500 firms in the proprietary 
sample, and the ratio of total assets (TA), total tax expense (TXT), and total cash paid for taxes (TXPD)  
for the S&P 500 firms in the proprietary sample to all S&P 500 firms. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Compensation Variables      
Total CEO Compensation 13,662,000 9,839,090 13,722,377 4,670,010 17,645,995 
Total Tax Director Compensation 787,727 558,714 695,740 340,909 974,043 
Total GC Compensation 2,114,037 1,355,193 2,200,675 758,726 2,642,015 
Total CFO Compensation 1,178,060 888,292 980,002 550,343 1,445,396 
CEO Compensation Mix 0.848 0.902 0.161 0.823 0.939 
Tax Director Compensation Mix 0.593 0.629 0.205 0.483 0.747 
GC Compensation Mix 0.718 0.762 0.183 0.644 0.848 
CFO Compensation Mix 0.682 0.722 0.181 0.604 0.811 
CEO Bonus Mix 0.133 0.105 0.120 0.056 0.182 
Tax Director Bonus Mix 0.138 0.128 0.090 0.078 0.189 
GC Bonus Mix 0.138 0.119 0.103 0.069 0.188 
CFO Bonus Mix 0.139 0.127 0.098 0.075 0.190 
Tax Variables      
Book-Tax Gap 274 67 2,153 -41 358 
Scaled Book-Tax Gap 0.050 0.016 0.340 0.000 0.043 
GAAP ETR 0.297 0.313 0.148 0.246 0.358 
Cash ETR 0.287 0.233 0.262 0.123 0.338 
Cash ETR (w/o Option Benefit) 0.283 0.230 0.262 0.118 0.333 
Cash ETR (3 Year) 0.331 0.267 0.274 0.179 0.356 
Pre-Tax Book Income 1,838 683 3,730 187 1,791 
Taxable Income (Less Option Benefit) 1,270 446 3,178 96 1,387 
Taxable Income 1,397 470 2,984 104 1,419 
Cash Flow From Operations 2,283 796 4,126 271 2,140 
Tax Benefit of Stock Options 44.50 0.00 374.27 0.00 11.90 
DTAX 0.102 0.010 0.478 -0.015 0.075 
SHELTER 0.941 0.981 0.114 0.946 0.994 
Financial Variables      
Market-to-Book Ratio 3.38 2.42 3.39 1.62 3.79 
Market Capitalization 23,555 9,173 42,365 3,060 21,329 
Revenue 17,817 8,211 31,817 3,183 17,854 
Return on Assets 0.052 0.049 0.066 0.016 0.090 
Prior Year’s Return 0.093 0.128 0.329 -0.021 0.257 
Std. ROA 0.159 0.128 0.144 0.065 0.203 
Prior Year’s Volatility 0.008 0.004 0.014 0.002 0.008 
Leverage 0.202 0.184 0.132 0.104 0.285 
Additional Control Variables      
Change in Goodwill 0.027 0.001 0.072 0.000 0.014 
New Investment 0.038 0.020 0.065 0.001 0.055 
Foreign Assets 0.268 0.166 0.313 0.000 0.458 
Geographic Complexity 0.730 0.853 0.298 0.462 1.000 
Industry Complexity 0.657 0.773 0.368 0.314 1.000 
Audit Fees 7,154 4,140 11,289 1,963 8,127 
Tax Fees 0.159 0.067 0.221 0.013 0.222 
Proportion Tax Fees 0.183 0.137 0.164 0.050 0.271 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the sample of 985 firm-year observations for which we have all 
of the variables in the table. All variables are as defined in Appendix A.  
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Table 3 
 
Determinants of the GAAP and Cash Effective Tax Rates 
 GAAP ETR  Cash ETR 
 Compensation 
 Level 
Compensation 
 Mix 
 Compensation 
 Level 
Compensation 
 Mix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 0.411*** 0.461*** 0.205*** 0.213***  0.260 0.354** 0.234*** 0.204*** 
 (3.09) (4.26) (2.90) (3.17)  (1.54) (2.33) (2.76) (2.65) 
CEO Incentives -0.001  0.010   -0.014  -0.107  
 (-0.09)  (0.21)   (-1.55)  (-1.59)  
Tax Director Incentives -0.028*** -0.024*** -0.075** -0.064*  -0.023 -0.015 -0.040 -0.010 
 (-2.70) (-2.78) (-2.20) (-1.95)  (-1.36) (-1.11) (-0.62) (-0.21) 
General Counsel Incentives 0.001  -0.008   0.011  0.016  
 (0.12)  (-0.17)   (1.12)  (0.23)  
CFO Incentives 0.008  0.019   0.022  0.118  
 (0.87)  (0.42)   (1.43)  (1.62)  
Return on Assets 0.343*** 0.347*** 0.371*** 0.374***  0.264** 0.272** 0.267** 0.289** 
 (3.67) (3.72) (3.95) (4.05)  (2.21) (2.26) (2.23) (2.42) 
Std. Dev. ROA -0.089** -0.09** -0.091** -0.092**  -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.116*** -0.115*** 
 (-2.53) (-2.52) (-2.56) (-2.57)  (-3.14) (-3.03) (-3.07) (-3.07) 
Log(Market Cap) 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.005  0.003 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.20) (1.44) (0.81) (0.89)  (0.37) (0.50) (-0.12) (-0.08) 
Leverage -0.018 -0.017 -0.021 -0.021  -0.022 -0.019 -0.024 -0.021 
 (-0.34) (-0.32) (-0.41) (-0.41)  (-0.32) (-0.28) (-0.34) (-0.30) 
Change in Goodwill -0.027 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025  0.196* 0.199* 0.190 0.201* 
 (-0.49) (-0.47) (-0.45) (-0.45)  (1.70) (1.73) (1.64) (1.74) 
New Investment 0.074 0.074 0.081 0.082  -0.362*** -0.362*** -0.354*** -0.361*** 
 (0.82) (0.83) (0.90) (0.93)  (-3.24) (-3.23) (-3.14) (-3.26) 
Foreign Assets 0.037* 0.036* 0.037* 0.037*  0.018 0.019 0.017 0.019 
 (1.83) (1.85) (1.86) (1.86)  (0.76) (0.83) (0.71) (0.81) 
Geographic Complexity 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.094***  0.044 0.041 0.040 0.042 
 (3.68) (3.58) (3.64) (3.63)  (1.34) (1.22) (1.23) (1.26) 
Industry Complexity -0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.000  0.006 0.008 0.009 0.010 
 (-0.30) (-0.23) (0.00) (0.03)  (0.30) (0.37) (0.43) (0.48) 
Proportion Tax Fees -0.042 -0.044 -0.052* -0.053*  -0.044 -0.050 -0.046 -0.055 
 (-1.34) (-1.41) (-1.66) (-1.67)  (-1.09) (-1.21) (-1.14) (-1.36) 
Tax Fees 0.012 0.014 0.022 0.022  0.062 0.064 0.063 0.069 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.49) (0.49)  (0.95) (0.98) (0.97) (1.06) 
Nobs 985 985 985 985  985 985 985 985 
Adjusted R2 12.7% 12.6% 12.3% 12.3%  9.4% 8.9% 9.2% 8.7% 
This table presents the estimates of equation (1) where the dependent variable is either the GAAP ETR or 
the Cash ETR. GAAP ETR is the financial effective tax rate for the year defined as total income tax 
expense scaled by pre-tax income (Compustat TXT / PI). Cash ETR is the cash effective tax rate for the 
year defined as the sum of total income taxes paid and the tax benefit of stock options scaled by pre-tax 
income ((TXPD + (TXBCO + TXBCOF)) / PI). Incentives for the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and 
CFO are measured as either Compensation Level (i.e., the natural logarithm of total annual compensation) 
or Compensation Mix (i.e., the ratio of variable compensation to total compensation). The remaining 
variables are as defined in Appendix A. Year and industry indicators are included but unreported. t-
statistics calculated using robust standard errors (based on two-way clustering by firm and year) are 
reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (two-
sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
 
Determinants of the Book-Tax Gap and Components 
 Compensation Level Compensation Mix 
 BTG PBI TI Diff BTG PBI TI Diff 
Intercept 0.183* -0.110* -0.14** 0.240 0.100 -0.117*** -0.091** 0.470 
 (1.78) (-1.74) (-2.00) (0.63) (1.39) (-2.86) (-2.19) (0.49) 
CEO Incentives -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 0.020 -0.045 -0.033** -0.013 0.970 
 (-0.17) (-1.36) (-1.34) (0.90) (-0.94) (-1.98) (-0.62) (0.32) 
Tax Director Incentives -0.007 -0.006 0.002 3.340 -0.033 -0.001 0.027 3.910 
 (-1.08) (-1.46) (0.45) (0.07) (-1.31) (-0.06) (1.62) (0.05) 
General Counsel Incentives 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.390 0.055* 0.013 -0.018 3.700 
 (0.85) (1.11) (0.44) (0.53) (1.81) (0.81) (-1.04) (0.05) 
CFO Incentives -0.004 0.005 0.004 0.100 0.008 0.033* 0.019 0.730 
 (-0.74) (1.42) (1.08) (0.76) (0.24) (1.91) (1.11) (0.39) 
Operating Cash Flow 0.155* 0.836*** 0.591*** 17.250 0.153* 0.839*** 0.593*** 17.450 
 (1.85) (11.99) (11.22) (0.00) (1.80) (12.37) (11.16) (0.00) 
Std. Dev. ROA 0.020 0.012 -0.002 0.370 0.019 0.012 -0.001 0.350 
 (0.56) (0.42) (-0.11) (0.54) (0.54) (0.43) (-0.05) (0.56) 
Log(Market Cap) 0.002 0.014*** 0.007*** 3.910 0.001 0.012*** 0.007*** 3.540 
 (0.70) (3.96) (3.05) (0.05) (0.19) (4.23) (3.04) (0.06) 
Leverage -0.014 -0.016 -0.037* 0.840 -0.016 -0.015 -0.035* 0.790 
 (-0.36) (-0.64) (-1.77) (0.36) (-0.44) (-0.62) (-1.69) (0.37) 
Change in Goodwill 0.065 -0.042 -0.067* 0.650 0.063 -0.044 -0.068* 0.620 
 (1.21) (-1.18) (-1.72) (0.42) (1.15) (-1.22) (-1.73) (0.43) 
New Investment -0.062 0.091 0.089* 0.000 -0.061 0.089 0.088* 0.000 
 (-0.90) (1.51) (1.81) (0.97) (-0.88) (1.46) (1.76) (0.98) 
Foreign Assets 0.000 0.020 0.011 0.890 -0.002 0.019 0.011 0.800 
 (0.00) (1.56) (0.93) (0.35) (-0.12) (1.63) (1.00) (0.37) 
Geographic Complexity 0.024 0.036*** 0.016 1.770 0.024 0.036** 0.017 1.710 
 (1.10) (2.73) (0.96) (0.18) (1.13) (2.49) (0.96) (0.19) 
Industry Complexity -0.068* -0.040* 0.010 6.550 -0.069* -0.041* 0.010 6.600 
 (-1.96) (-1.89) (0.44) (0.01) (-1.91) (-1.83) (0.38) (0.01) 
Proportion Tax Fees 0.000 0.031** 0.026* 0.170 0.002 0.031** 0.025* 0.240 
 (0.02) (2.03) (1.84) (0.68) (0.08) (2.18) (1.73) (0.62) 
Tax Fees 0.016 -0.004 -0.003 0.030 0.016 -0.004 -0.003 0.010 
 (1.12) (-0.50) (-0.36) (0.86) (1.16) (-0.46) (-0.37) (0.92) 
Nobs 985 985 985  985 985 985  
Adjusted R2 7.6% 60.8% 50.1%  8.0% 60.8% 50.3%  
This table presents the estimates of equation (2) where the dependent variable in the first column is the 
Book-Tax Gap (BTG). The second and third columns present results when the Book-Tax Gap is 
disaggregated into its two components, Pre-Tax Book Income (PBI) and Taxable Income (TI), and the 
equations are jointly estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regression. The fourth column, Diff, presents 
the results of a chi-square test of the difference between the estimated coefficients in the PBI and TI 
models. Incentives for the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO are measured as either the natural 
logarithm of total compensation or compensation mix. The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix 
A. Year and industry indicators are included but unreported. t-statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors (based on two-way clustering by firm and year) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient 
estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5 
 
Measures of Tax Aggressiveness (DTAX and Shelter) 
 DTAX  Shelter 
Intercept 0.435 0.579  0.523*** 0.542*** 
 (0.74) (0.84)  (4.53) (5.68) 
CEO Incentives -0.013   0.001  
 (-0.38)   (0.20)  
Tax Director Incentives -0.079 -0.072  0.003 0.005 
 (-0.83) (-1.03)  (0.37) (0.72) 
General Counsel Incentives -0.048   0.005  
 (-1.08)   (1.04)  
CFO Incentives 0.079   -0.002  
 (0.82)   (-0.32)  
Return on Assets -0.006 0.018  0.183* 0.184* 
 (-0.01) (0.04)  (1.87) (1.88) 
Std. Dev. ROA -0.317 -0.383  -0.221 -0.216 
 (-0.38) (-0.46)  (-1.64) (-1.64) 
Log(Market Cap) 0.008 0.008  0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.23) (0.21)  (6.08) (6.32) 
Leverage -0.047 -0.031  -0.073* -0.074* 
 (-0.18) (-0.12)  (-1.79) (-1.83) 
Change in Goodwill 1.483** 1.489**  0.025 0.025 
 (2.23) (2.25)  (0.54) (0.53) 
New Investment -1.119* -1.136*  -0.038 -0.035 
 (-1.86) (-1.89)  (-0.58) (-0.53) 
Foreign Assets 0.032 0.031  0.019 0.019 
 (0.23) (0.22)  (1.07) (1.08) 
Geographic Complexity 0.006 0.003  -0.060** -0.060** 
 (0.04) (0.02)  (-2.38) (-2.43) 
Industry Complexity -0.019 -0.020  -0.006 -0.005 
 (-0.15) (-0.15)  (-0.43) (-0.39) 
Proportion Tax Fees 0.586** 0.570**  -0.051 -0.051 
 (2.35) (2.36)  (-1.57) (-1.57) 
Tax Fees -0.270 -0.274  0.064 0.065 
 (-0.92) (-0.94)  (1.59) (1.62) 
Nobs 985 985  985 985 
Adjusted R2 10.4% 10.1%  41.9% 41.9% 
This table presents the estimates of equations (3) and (4) where the dependent variable is either DTAX (i.e., 
excess permanent differences and ETR differentials as defined in Frank et al., 2009 and modified with the 
inclusion of estimated foreign assets) or Shelter (i.e., Wilson’s (2009) measure of the probability that the 
firm engages in a tax shelter). Incentives for the CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO are measured 
as the level of total compensation. The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix A. Year and 
industry indicators are included but unreported. t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors (based on 
two-way clustering by firm and year) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
 
Reverse Regression - Compensation Level 
 CEO Tax  GC CFO 
Intercept 12.617*** 10.015*** 10.85*** 11.041*** 
 (26.57) (28.74) (24.79) (38.60) 
Return on Assets 2.291*** 1.829*** 2.104*** 2.041*** 
 (4.04) (4.53) (4.10) (5.21) 
Std. Dev. ROA -1.771*** 0.317 0.955 -0.374 
 (-2.66) (0.60) (1.39) (-0.65) 
Log(Market Cap) 0.381*** 0.350*** 0.294*** 0.287*** 
 (10.99) (12.55) (7.73) (12.55) 
Leverage -0.180 0.018 -0.073 0.066 
 (-0.65) (0.08) (-0.26) (0.33) 
Change in Goodwill 0.027 -0.045 0.029 0.069 
 (0.06) (-0.17) (0.07) (0.24) 
New Investment 0.533 0.231 0.557 0.261 
 (0.92) (0.60) (1.10) (0.70) 
Foreign Assets -0.046 0.050 0.015 -0.005 
 (-0.33) (0.47) (0.13) (-0.05) 
Geographic Complexity -0.197 -0.056 -0.263 -0.212* 
 (-1.10) (-0.39) (-1.43) (-1.76) 
Industry Complexity 0.184 -0.048 0.134 0.120 
 (1.63) (-0.56) (1.22) (1.54) 
Proportion Tax Fees -0.375 0.125 -0.239 -0.315* 
 (-1.59) (0.64) (-1.00) (-1.77) 
Tax Fees 0.778** 0.093 0.551* 0.36* 
 (2.32) (0.36) (1.70) (1.65) 
GAAP ETR -0.138 -0.363*** -0.140 -0.087 
 (-0.54) (-2.63) (-0.70) (-0.64) 
Cash ETR 0.044 0.123 0.262* 0.155 
 (0.25) (0.98) (1.71) (1.33) 
     
GAAP ETR vs. Cash ETR (F-stat) 0.008 4.90** 3.27* 0.64 
p-value 0.927 0.027 0.071 0.426 
Nobs 985 985 985 985 
Adjusted R2 36.1%  44.9%  31.7%  43.1% 
This table presents the estimates of regressing CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO incentive 
compensation on economic determinants of incentive compensation and the GAAP ETR and Cash ETR. 
The dependent variables are measured as the natural logarithm of the level of total annual compensation. 
The remaining variables are as defined in Appendix A. Year and industry indicators are included but 
unreported. t-statistics calculated using robust standard errors (based on two-way clustering by firm and 
year) are reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. The F-statistic and associated p-value 
from the test of the equality of the estimated coefficients on GAAP ETR and Cash ETR are reported. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Propensity Score Matched-Pair Analysis 
 
Panel A:  Differences in GAAP ETR 
Treatment Wilcoxon p-value t-statistic p-value 
Mean 
Difference in 
GAAP ETR 
Median 
Difference in 
GAAP ETR 
CEO Compensation 0.557 0.577 -0.446 0.655 -0.003 0.005 
Tax Director Compensation -4.050*** 0.000 -3.519*** 0.000 -0.029 -0.018 
General Counsel Compensation 0.321 0.749 0.202 0.840 0.001 0.000 
CFO Compensation -0.890 0.373 -0.230 0.818 -0.002 -0.006 
CEO Comp Mix -0.477 0.633 -1.224 0.221 -0.009 0.000 
Tax Director Comp Mix -2.204** 0.028 -2.223** 0.027 -0.019 -0.011 
General Counsel Comp Mix 0.275 0.784 0.125 0.901 0.001 0.000 
CFO Comp Mix -1.389 0.165 -0.734 0.463 -0.005 -0.008 
 
 
Panel B:  Differences in Cash ETR 
Treatment Wilcoxon p-value t-statistic p-value 
Mean 
Difference in 
Cash ETR 
Median 
Difference in 
Cash ETR 
CEO Compensation 0.062 0.951 0.402 0.688 0.005 -0.003 
Tax Director Compensation 0.679 0.497 -0.004 0.997 0.000 0.015 
General Counsel Compensation -0.233 0.816 -0.712 0.477 -0.009 0.000 
CFO Compensation 0.920 0.357 1.567 0.118 0.020 0.000 
CEO Comp Mix -1.381 0.167 -1.079 0.281 -0.014 -0.009 
Tax Director Comp Mix 0.110 0.912 0.180 0.857 0.002 0.000 
General Counsel Comp Mix 0.592 0.554 0.687 0.492 0.009 0.000 
CFO Comp Mix 0.989 0.323 0.793 0.428 0.010 0.011 
This table presents the results of the difference in GAAP ETR (Panel A) and Cash ETR (Panel B) between 
the matched pairs of firms for different treatments which are either the level or mix of compensation for the 
CEO, tax director, general counsel, and CFO. The first column presents the treatment for which we 
modeled the conditional probability of having a certain level of the treatment (conditional on economic and 
tax planning characteristics) and then matched firms with the most similar conditional probability of 
treatment but the largest difference in the observed level of treatment. The second and third columns 
present a Wilcoxon statistic of the rank-sum difference in the median ETR between the matched pairs of 
firms and the corresponding p-value (two-sided). The fourth and fifth columns present a t-statistic for a test 
of the difference in the mean ETR between the matched pairs and the associated p-value (two-sided). The 
sixth and seventh columns present the mean and median difference in GAAP ETR (Panel A) and Cash ETR 
(Panel B) between the matched pairs. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (two-sided) at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
